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The Direct Impact of Disparate Impact Claims on
Banks
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest challenges in the fight to eliminate
discriminatory lending practices is proving that a party intended to create
a racial imbalance or to discriminate against a protected class.1 Proving
intent is especially tricky because it is mistakenly assumed that in the
absence of overt discrimination a bank’s racial composition of customers
would mirror that of society.2 Indeed, many racial imbalances in society
today are created unintentionally.3 So, the question must be posed—is it
the duty of the judiciary to police unintentional discrimination? In the
summer of 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court answered this question in Texas
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
Project.4 The Court held that the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) recognizes
disparate impact claims and that the Texas Department of Housing’s
distribution of FHA tax credits was done in a way that led to unintentional
discrimination.5
Even though Inclusive Communities did not directly involve
lenders, its holding could significantly impact lenders in two ways. First,
disparate impact claims may now be brought against lenders under an
additional provision of the FHA.6 Second, this ruling could allow
disparate impact claims to be brought in other fair lending causes of
action such as those brought under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
1. Nikole Hannah-Jones, How the Supreme Court Could Scuttle Critical Fair Housing
Rule, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-supremecourt-could-scuttle-critical-fair-housing-rule.
2. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2530 (2015) (discussing the difficulty of proving intent for a discrimination claim).
3. Lauren Kirchner, What Happens When Biases Are Inadvertently Baked Into
Algorithms,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
9,
2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/discrimination-algorithms-disparateimpact/403969/.
4. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2550.
5. Id.
6. See infra Part II (arguing that disparate impact claims could be brought under 42
U.S.C. § 3605).
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(“ECOA”).7 As a result, these expansions to discrimination claims
against lenders could have a major impact on future bank litigation.8
Facially neutral lending practices that impact classes in a statistically
disproportionate way could unintentionally violate the FHA. 9 From the
perspective of equal housing advocates, on the other hand, this ruling is
a victory in fighting discrimination through the FHA because of the
broadened recognition of disparate impact claims.10
Both the majority and dissent in Inclusive Communities expressed
concerns that the Court’s holding could lead to abuse and ultimately
undermine the FHA’s goal of eliminating discrimination and improving
lending options for minority borrowers.11 In order to combat these
concerns, the Court placed a number of limitations on disparate impact
claims.12 These limitations are favorable to the defendant of an FHA
claim, because they have tightened the requirements for a plaintiff’s
prima facie case and loosened the standards for the business necessity
rebuttal.13 Without this high burden of proof at the pleading stage, there
could be a sizable increase in disparate impact claims against lenders,
resulting in increased litigation costs.14 The threat of litigation and the
accompanying expenses could force lenders to rely on racial statistics and
unintentionally create quotas in hopes of avoiding litigation.15
Furthermore, the use of quotas or racial considerations in lending
decisions brings about a number of constitutional questions.16
This Note will explain the importance of these limitations set

7. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2014).
8. See infra Part III (discussing how disparate impact claims could result into increased

litigation costs for banks).
9. See Joe Adler, Supreme Court Backs ‘Disparate Impact’ Theory in Texas Case, AM.
BANKER 2015 (discussing the ABA’s argument that disparate impact theory is not the correct
way to achieve fairness and prevent discrimination in lending practices).
10. Id.
11. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id. (explaining that a low burden of proof at the pleading stage could lead to an
increase in litigation costs); Christopher Roach, Supreme Court Takes on Housing
Discrimination, JDSUPRA BUS. (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/supremecourt-takes-on-housing-49737/.
15. Bankers to Obama: Stop ‘Abusing’ Disparate Impact Charges, INVESTORS (Aug. 18,
2015, 6:36 PM), http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/081815-767118-bankers-groupdemands-obama-regulators-revise-disparate-impact-standards.htm; Roach, supra note 14.
16. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (explaining that the use of racial
consideration in lending decisions could be unconstitutional).
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forth in Inclusive Communities and how this decision will impact banks.17
Part II of this Note discusses the history and evolution of disparate impact
theory and how the rationale used in Inclusive Communities could have a
major impact on lenders.18 Part III explains the limitations embedded in
this ruling and how they may help mitigate many lenders’ concerns of
unintentional FHA violations.19 Part IV reviews the most recent disparate
impact cases and how these limitations are being applied in courts
today.20 Lastly, Part V offers recommendations for banks to avoid
potential liability from disparate impact claims under the FHA. 21
II. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND THE HISTORY OF DISPARATE IMPACT
Lenders are most likely to unintentionally violate the FHA under
42 U.S.C. § 3605.22 The central purpose of this provision is to eradicate
discriminatory practices in any “real estate-related transaction.”23 The
statute states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose
business includes engaging in real estate-related
transaction to discriminate against any person in making
available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions
of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin.24
In Inclusive Communities, the Court found that the statutory
language of §§ 3601-361925 of the FHA required a results-oriented
approach where the consequences of the action should be examined
instead of the actor’s intent.26 This was the same conclusion found in

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra Part III & IV.
See infra notes 19–52 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
Lenders would most likely violate this provision because of its focus on real estate
related transactions. For example, when a lender provides the funding to purchase a house,
he would be subject to this provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2013).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2013).
26. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
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both Griggs v. Duke Power Co.27 and Smith v. City of Jackson,28 where
the Court discussed disparate impact under both Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (“ADEA”).29 Both of these cases also held that when the statutory
language refers to the consequences of actions and not just to the mindset
of the actors, the statute should be read to encompass disparate impact
claims.30 This precedent provided the support needed to conclude that
the FHA encompasses disparate impact claims.31
The standard for employment discrimination disparate impact
claims was established in Griggs, which allowed claims for statistical
disparities with very few limitations.32 This standard was then
substantially limited in Wards Cover Packing Co. v. Atonio,33 as the
Court required the plaintiff to point to a specific policy or practice that
caused the discriminatory effect and allowed the defendant to raise the
defense of business necessity.34 While Congress later expanded that
standard for Title VII claims when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
the standard for claims under the ADEA has remained consistent with the
standard set forth in Wards Cover Packing Co.35 The narrowest standard
yet, however, was adopted in Inclusive Communities for FHA claims, as
it requires everything needed for an ADEA claim36 but also tightens the
requirements for a prima facie case and broadens the business necessity
defense.37 This updated standard could help protect lenders from
disparate impact claims brought under the FHA because of the difficulty
2507, 2510 (2015).
27. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
28. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
29. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2516–17 (discussing the court’s reasoning in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and Smith v. City of Jackson).
30. Id. at 2518.
31. See id. at 2522–23 (concluding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under
FHA).
32. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
33. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
34. Id. at 650.
35. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
36. See Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 656 (requiring the plaintiff to point to a
specific policy that caused the discriminatory effect in order to meet the prima facie burden).
37. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (increasing the burden on the plaintiff in bringing a prima facie case
and expanding the defendant’s ability to use the business necessity defense through additional
limitations. The business necessity defense allows a defendant to defend their practice by
arguing that the practice is necessary for a valid business reason).
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a plaintiff is faced with in proving that a specific policy or practice caused
the discriminatory impact.38
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) has the responsibility
of interpreting and enforcing the FHA and has the power to issue relevant
FHA regulations.39 In 2013, the Secretary of HUD issued a regulation
interpreting the FHA to encompass disparate impact liability. 40 Along
with formalizing the long-held recognition of disparate impact claims in
this regulation, HUD also created a universal test, the “Burden Shifting
Test,”41 for determining whether a practice has an unjustified
discriminatory effect.42
The Burden Shifting Test first requires the plaintiff to make a
prima facie showing of disparate impact by exhibiting a specific policy
or practice that has caused a discriminatory effect.43 This is different than
proving that the defendant intended to discriminate, as it only requires the
plaintiff to show that a policy resulted in a discriminatory effect.44 If the
plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case for disparate impact, the
burden then shifts to the defendant to prove that the practice or policy is
necessary to achieve one or more substantial and legitimate
nondiscriminatory interests.45 If the defendant is able to meet this
standard, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the interests
served by the practice could be achieved by another practice with a less
discriminatory effect.46 The Burden Shifting Test places a high initial
burden on the plaintiff and allows the defendant to defend its identified
practice.47 In Inclusive Communities, the Supreme Court adopted the

38. Paul Hancock & Andrew Glass, Symposium: The Supreme Court Recognizes But
Limits Disparate Impact in its Fair Housing Act Decision, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2015,
8:58 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/paul-hancock-fha/.
39. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed.
Reg. 11460, 11460 (2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
40. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2514 (2015) (adopting this standard from the ADEA’s standard for disparate impact
claims and from Wards Cove Packing Co.).
41. The name of the test comes from the fact that once a party meets their burden the
burden then “shifts” to the other party. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2513.
45. Id. at 2515.
46. Id.
47. See Bankers to Obama: Stop ‘Abusing’ Disparate Impact Charges, supra note 15
(discussing the importance of a high burden on disparate impact claims).
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Burden Shifting Test and used it to determine if a specific practice or
policy violated the FHA.48
This decision set the standard for claims arising under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601–3619,49 but could very likely be expanded to claims under 42
U.S.C. § 3605, which deals specifically with real estate-related
transactions.50 As lenders who are engaging in real estate-related
transactions would be subject to § 3605 of the FHA, the standard for
disparate impact claims is very important moving forward.51 Inclusive
Communities made a strong articulation of the FHA’s purpose, scope, and
structure and that interpretation may be invoked in future cases involving
other unresolved interpretations of the FHA.52 The Court in Inclusive
Communities argued that the wording “otherwise make unavailable” in
§§ 3601–3619 requires a results-oriented approach, although these words
are not found in the statutory language of § 3605.53 It follows that
disparate impact claims may not be allowed under § 3605.54 As discussed
in Part IV, in City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co.,55 the Court said
disparate impact claims are permitted to be heard under 42 U.S.C.
§ 3605.56 Thus, if disparate impact claims are allowed to be heard under
42 U.S.C. § 3605, the most likely standard would be the one established
in Inclusive Communities.
Another way this decision could have an impact on banks is if it
is construed to allow disparate impact claims to be brought under other
fair lending causes of actions. The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (“CFPB”) is already doing so and has argued for some time now
that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ECOA in an effort

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514–15.
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2013).
Id. at § 3605.
42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2013).
Mark C. Fang & Jay C. Carlisle II, Administrative Estoppel and the Fair Housing
Act,
N.Y.U
L.
REV.
(Dec.
10,
2015),
http://www.newyorkjournal.com/id=1202744461224/Administrative-Estoppel-and-the-Fair
-Housing-Act?slreturn=20151122113255.
53. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2510.
54. Since the statutory language of § 3605 does not include “otherwise make
unavailable,” it does not require the results-oriented approach. Since § 3605 does not require
the results-oriented approach, disparate impact claims would not be cognizable under the
statute. Id.
55. City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:13-cv-09007-ODW(RZx), 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93451 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015).
56. See id. at *1.
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to challenge discriminatory practices in the auto lending industry. 57
Inclusive Communities could help bolster the CFPB’s argument that
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ECOA, but the decision
could also create new limits if the same standard is applied.58
III. THE LIMITATIONS ON DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS
Although the U.S. Supreme Court held that disparate impact
claims were cognizable under the FHA, it spent the majority of its
analysis focusing on the importance of limitations and the proper way to
ensure that these claims were not abused.59 It warned that if these
limitations were not properly applied, disparate impact liability could
undermine any benefit provided to minority low-income borrowers for
fear of liability.60 In order to limit the abuse of disparate impact claims,
the Court established the following limitations as guiding steps in the
evaluation process: (1) claims for disparate impact should be examined
with care at the pleading stage;61 (2) plaintiffs must identify a specific
policy of the defendants that has caused the discriminatory effect; 62 (3)
policies being challenged under disparate impact theory must create an
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barrier to the protected class in order
for it to meet the prima facie burden;63 (4) defendants must be allowed to
explain the valid interests served by their practices;64 and (5) remedial
orders for liability under the disparate impact theory must concentrate on
the elimination of the offending practice through “race neutral” means

57. The House of Representatives passed a bill to nullify CFPB Bulletin 2013-02 dealing
with the use of disparate impact against auto lenders. See H.R. 1737, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
The CFPB has been widely criticized for irresponsibly bringing disparate impact claims
without proper support. Id. The Senate has received the bill and it has been read twice but
there has been no action yet. Id.
58. See id. (suggesting that since Inclusive Communities held that disparate impact
claims are cognizable under the FHA, they may also be cognizable under the ECOA but these
claims are subject to a number of limitations in order to avoid abuse).
59. Hancock & Glass, supra note 38.
60. Id.
61. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (examining with care at the pleading stage is used to tighten the
requirements for a prima facie case by allowing the court to enforce a higher burden on the
plaintiff).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2524.
64. Id. at 2518.
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instead of punitive measures.65 These limitations were put in place to
narrow the application of disparate impact claims in hopes of avoiding
abusive claims and the creation of quotas.66
A.

Courts Should Examine Disparate Impact Claims with Care at
the Pleading Stage In Order to Deter Excessive Litigation Costs

Assuming this decision applies to lenders through other
provisions of the FHA or other fair lending causes of actions, the
limitations placed on disparate impact claims may actually benefit
lenders. The threat of disparate impact claims is nothing new to most
lenders because the majority of courts have allowed its use and the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and CFPB have consistently brought
disparate impact claims under the FHA and ECOA.67 So, even though
lenders took a hit with the Court’s finding that disparate impact was
cognizable under the FHA, the narrow standard applied in Inclusive
Communities could actually improve a banking lender’s ability to defend
themselves.
Lenders will be concerned with the likely increase in litigation
costs that may result from an increase in disparate impact claims. 68 The
DOJ and CFPB have already have used disparate impact theory and have
been awarded hundreds of millions dollars from lenders.69 These
increased litigation costs may push cost-conscious lenders to settle weak
claims instead of risking greater losses through litigation.70 Further, the
expenses will force lenders to make changes to their current lending

65. Id. at 2524.
66. Id. at 2523; see also Hancock & Glass, supra note 38 (showing the potential abuse

that can result without the proper limitations).
67. See Bankers to Obama: Stop ‘Abusing’ Disparate Impact Charges, supra note 15;
Rachel Witkowski, CFPB Overestimates Potential Discrimination, AM. BANKER, Sept. 17,
2015 (discussing how for the past few years, mortgage lenders have been sued under disparate
impact theory for racial bias based on no evidence but racial statistics).
68. Roach, supra note 14.
69. Greg Stohr, Insurers Disappointed as Supreme Court Back Disparate Impact
Claims,
INS.
J.
(2015),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2015/06/25/373004.htm.
70. Ed Mannino, Supreme Court Holds That Disparate Impact Claims Can Be Brought
Under The Fair Housing Act, ED MANNINO BLOG
(June 25, 2015),
http://edmannino.com/blog/supreme-court-holds-that-disparate-impact-claims-can-bebrought-under-the-fair-housing-act/.
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practices by minimizing litigation or risk.71
Justice Alito pointed out that Inclusive Communities creates a
standard that will inevitably force lenders to turn away more minority
applicants because lenders will turn to more strict criteria in order to
avoid violating the FHA.72 These increased costs might push lenders into
shrinking their operation in order to reduce the risk of litigation, likely
hurting the people the disparate impact claims aim to protect.73 To
combat this uncertainty, lenders will most likely “either create cookiecutter loans with rigid criteria” or completely remove certain credit
products for which the financial risk of litigation outweighs the expected
revenue.74 These adjustments will ultimately hurt the consumer who
would no longer be able to receive traditional loans under strengthened
criteria.75
Another possible result of the increased litigation and the
associated costs would be lenders unintentionally moving towards
numerical quotas or considering race as a factor when making lending
decisions.76 This unforeseen result would raise new constitutional issues
and could make race a primary consideration, which may increase
discrimination rather than mitigate it.77 These practices could potentially
violate the Equal Protection Clause (“EPC”), as the Supreme Court has
repeatedly said that the use of racial quotas is unconstitutional.78 Lenders
would be forced to balance making profit-driven decisions and the threat
of unintentionally violating either the FHA or the EPC.79 This
cost/benefit analysis would create an unfair burden on lenders and

71. Adler, supra note 9.
72. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.

Ct. 2507, 2532 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that this decision would actually hurt
the very people it is attempting to protect); Mannino, supra note 70.
73. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2532 (Alito, J., dissenting).
74. Letter from Independent Bankers Association of Texas President and CEO
Christopher L. Williston to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (Jan. 17 ,
2012) (on file with author) (letter expressing the comments of IBAT about the HUD proposed
Regulation that was passed in 2013).
75. Id.
76. Hancock & Glass, supra note 38.
77. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2551 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court
recognizes by allowing these claims, lenders would inevitably make race a primary
consideration in order to avoid potential liability and yet they still find that these claims are
cognizable under the FHA).
78. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Hancock & Glass, supra note 38.
79. Roach, supra note 14.
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introduce new factors to the credit underwriting process unrelated to the
borrower’s credit-worthiness or ability to pay the loan.80
The risk of hurting minority low-income borrowers and the use
of racial quotas in lending decisions can best be minimized by careful
examination of a plaintiff’s prima facie case at the pleading stage.81
Disparate impact claims brought under the FHA or other fair lending
causes of action should not be interpreted so broadly that findings of
disparate impact liability forces racial considerations to be injected into
every decision.82 The requirement of careful examination at the pleading
stage empowers courts to come to a “prompt resolution to these cases”83
by dismissing frivolous claims early on in the process thereby minimizing
the cost of litigation for the defendant.84 Lenders must be given the
latitude and the freedom to make necessary business decisions without
the threat of violating the FHA lurking around every corner.85 This
careful examination makes it tougher for a plaintiff to meet the
requirements for a prima facie disparate impact claim and should help
lenders have weaker claims dismissed at the pleading stage.
B.

Plaintiffs Have the Burden of Proving a Specific Practice Has
Caused a Discriminatory Effect

Before Inclusive Communities, courts still required the plaintiff
to identify a specific practice that caused the discriminatory effect to for
disparate impact claims in order to help deter frivolous or abusive
claims.86 This is particularly important when considering the recent
concerns about the CFPB’s methods of bringing disparate impact claims
based on faulty statistics.87
80. Christopher Allen et al., Don’t Discount Disparate Impact After High Court Case,
LAW360 (June 25, 2015), https://lawlibproxy2.unc.edu:2147/articles/674225/don-t-discountdisparate-impact-after-high-court-case.
81. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522.
82. Allen et al., supra note 80.
83. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522 (stressing the importance of these claims to
be resolved quickly in order to minimize the costs on the defendant).
84. Hancock & Glass, supra note 38.
85. Bankers to Obama: Stop ‘Abusing’ Disparate Impact Charges, supra note 15.
86. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (requiring a plaintiff
to point to a specific policy or practice when bringing a disparate impact claim under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act).
87. See Jennifer L. Gray, House of Representatives Vote to Repeal CFPB’s Auto Lending
Guidance and Issues Scathing Report on CFPB’s Methodology and Statistics, NAT’L L. REV.
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A second major concern for lenders is the risk of being found
liable for racial imbalances that they did not create.88 Racial imbalances
may have many causes and lenders could be unfairly victimized if forced
to accept liability for imbalances beyond their control.89 This risk is
particularly worrisome because of the ease of disparate impact claims in
finding an inadvertent bias in a seemingly neutral practice.90 The
American Bankers Association (“ABA”) expressed the same concern in
stating
that
“[d]own-payment
requirements,
debt-to-income
requirements, loan-to-value requirements and other neutral, risk-based
underwriting requirements can all affect various racial and ethnic groups
differently.”91 Showing a racial imbalance from a facially neutral price
model is not difficult because these inadvertent biases can be caused by
almost anything.92
The Inclusive Communities Court addressed this concern by
placing two burdens on the plaintiff.93 The first requirement is pointing
to a specific policy of the defendant; the second is the burden of proving
that that policy actually caused the discriminatory impact.94 Both
burdens can be very tough for a plaintiff to meet because of the number
of factors that go into lending decisions and the number of sources that
can cause a racial imbalance.95
The requirement that a plaintiff point to a defendant’s specific
policy ultimately helps to protect lenders, as a plaintiff’s pleading that
merely notes a statistical disparity will be quickly dismissed.96 It is very

(Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/house-representatives-votes-to-repealcfpb-s-auto-lending-guidance-and-issues (criticizing the CFPB for knowingly using faulty
statistics to bring disparate impact claims against auto lenders).
88. See Allen, supra note 80 (pointing out that the robust causality requirement protects
defendants from being held liable for imbalances they did not create).
89. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–24; Adler, supra note 9.
90. Kirchner, supra note 3.
91. Brief for the ABA at 14, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys.
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2014) (No. 13-1371), 2014 WL 2796302, at 14; Mannino, supra
note 70.
92. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2530 (Justice Alito arguing that racial imbalances
are everywhere in society, have existed throughout history, and can be caused by almost
anything); See Kirchner, supra note 3 (analyzing the Princeton Review’s pricing for online
SAT tutoring showed a racial imbalance that resulted from a neutral geographical pricing
method).
93. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514.
94. Id.
95. Hancock & Glass, supra note 38.
96. Id.
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difficult to prove the actual cause of a racial imbalance and the pleading
standard should, in principal, help eliminate any liability for racial
imbalances that lenders did not create.97 However, while the two burdens
should assist defendants in weeding out the most unmeritorious claims,
they do not completely eliminate the threat that lenders will be found
liable for racial imbalances they did not create.98
The two requirements should also help dismiss claims that arise
from inconsistent or faulty statistics, like in some of CFPB’s recent cases,
because of the difficulty the causation requirement creates.99 This
heightened standard should present a challenge to plaintiffs who choose
to bring claims with invalid support.
C.

Policy Must Create an Artificial, Arbitrary, and Unnecessary
Barrier in Order to Violate the FHA

Disparate impact claims may be used as a powerful incentive to
force a lender’s hand in certain business decisions and invalidate
profitable and fair policies.100 Moving forward, lenders will need to state
and explain why their practice or policy supports a valid interest in order
to maintain a credit-based lending system.101 Overbroad application of
these claims may cause lenders to make unprofitable business decisions
in the hopes of avoiding liability.102 When the fear of unintentionally
violating the FHA is greater than the desire to make a higher profit, the
effect of disparate impact precedent may exceed its intended scope.103
Lenders will substitute profit considerations with racial considerations,
which could result in completely eliminating certain high-risk lending

97. Id.
98. Mannino, supra note 70.
99. See H.R. 1737, 114th Cong. (2015) (criticizing the CFPB’s use of fault statistics

when bringing disparate impact claims against the auto lending industry).
100. Allen, supra note 80.
101. Hancock & Glass, supra note 38.
102. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2510 (2015); See id (arguing that overbroad application of these claims could
undermine the purpose of the FHA as well as the free-market system).
103. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524 (suggesting that “if the specter of disparateimpact litigation causes private developers to no longer construct or renovate housing units
for low-income individuals, then the FHA would have undermined its own purpose” and that
this would also be the case if the specter of disparate impact litigation caused lenders to no
longer lend to low-income individuals in order to better protect themselves from liability).
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practices.104 Some of these scrapped practices provide beneficial access
to capital for low-income minority borrowers and the loss could be
detrimental to the very borrowers these disparate impact claims are trying
to protect.105
To combat the fear of excluding low-income borrowers, the
Inclusive Communities Court expanded the use of the business necessity
defense so that only practices or policies that create an artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barrier to capital or a loan are liable under the FHA
through disparate impact theory.106 When policies or practices
discriminate against a protected class, they create barriers to fair
treatment of that class when attempting to get a loan. However, certain
prohibited behaviors may be necessary for continuing operations, and
thus, should be encouraged as long as they are for a valid purpose.107
Barriers created for unnecessary or artificial reasons and are not
necessary to the success of the business are the primary target of disparate
impact claims.108 For example, a bank’s policy of allowing lower interest
rates based on the borrower’s credit score should be permissible, because
the interest rate coincides with the chances of repayment and is necessary
for a lender to successfully run its business. On the other hand, a policy
that takes into consideration where someone lives to determine an interest
rate should not be allowed, because it is impermissible for determining
the probability of repayment. This shows the purpose of the decision is
to remove the intent barrier to thwart unintentional racial discrimination
but only when the policy fails to serve a legitimate purpose or business
need.109
This limitation leaves intact lenders’ policies that serve legitimate
business goals and will permit some leeway for making necessary
business decisions. This is achieved by both lessening the requirements

104. See id. (arguing that over broad application of these claims could lead to an
undermining of the free-market system and racial considerations being used in making
business decisions).
105. See City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:13-cv-09007-ODW(RZx),
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93451, at *33 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015) (criticizing plaintiffs for
choosing to attack a policy that benefits low-income minority borrowers); Adler, supra note
9 (discussing ABA’s argument that these claims will inevitably result in lenders to shrink
operations).
106. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522.
107. Hancock & Glass, supra note 38.
108. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524.
109. See id.
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of the business necessity defense and refocusing claims on policies that
have created barriers for unnecessary reasons.110 This added burden is a
strong weapon in defending legitimate business practices or policies that
lead to a statistical disparity.
D.

Defendants Must Be Allowed to Explain the Legitimate Purpose
a Policy or Practice Serves

One concern of lenders is that certain policies with legitimate
business purposes will be criticized as creating racial barriers.111 While
a policy may seem to create an artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barrier to receiving a loan or interest rate, it may actually serve a
legitimate business purpose. These claims may force lenders to move to
policies that consider race over objective credit risk factors or destroy
legitimate business practices that were determined to have violated the
FHA, even though someone or something else could have caused the
racial imbalance.112 Courts will not have the same knowledge and
understanding of the banking industry as the businesses at stake.113
Policies or practices that serve legitimate purposes may be found to
violate the FHA because that purpose is not properly understood. Thus,
these claims run the risk of punishing defendants for unintentional
behavior without permitting them to defend the legitimate interest of the
policy or practice.114
To prevent the elimination of legitimate business practices, the
Court adopted the “Burden Shifting Test,” which allows defendants to
explain the purpose of a challenged practice or policy.115 If the defendant
meets this requirement, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 2522.
Hancock & Glass, supra note 38.
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524; Adler, supra note 9.
See Ari Karen, How Disparate Impact Ruling Affects Lenders’ Daily Operations,
NAT’L
MORTGAGE
NEWS
(July
6,
2015),
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/compliance-regulation/how-disparate-impactruling-affects-lenders-daily-operations-1055261-1.html (assuming that bankers have a better
understanding of the lending industry to make practical business decisions than the court, and
thus recommending the regular analysis of lending practices by lending entities).
114. See Kirchner, supra note 3 (“Because disparate impact theory is results-oriented, it
would seem to be a good way to challenge algorithmic bias in court. A plaintiff would only
need to demonstrate bias in the results, without having to prove that a program was conceived
with bias as its goal.”).
115. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514.
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that there is a less discriminatory way of achieving the goal than the
current policy or practice.116 Using this test supports the Court’s
reasoning that the FHA is only supposed to remove barriers to renting,
buying, or securing financing for housing in three instances: (1) when
they create a discriminatory effect, (2) when the barrier does not serve a
legitimate purpose, or (3) when it serves a legitimate purpose but there is
a less discriminatory way to achieve that purpose.117 This test allows
lenders to defend and explain the legitimate business purpose of a policy
or practice, and again, loosens the requirements for asserting the business
necessity defense.
E.

Remedial Orders Must Concentrate on the Elimination of the
Offending Practice through “Race Neutral” Means Instead of
Punitive Measures

Lenders should also be concerned about the expensive judicial
awards for disparate impact liability. 118 The Court suggests that the
purpose of allowing FHA disparate impact claims is to eliminate practices
that have unintentionally discriminated against a protected minority class,
not to punish the actors that have unintentionally discriminated.119 As
discussed above, lenders will likely face increased litigation costs after
Inclusive Communities, but punitive damages could be even more costly
and burdensome.120 These judgments are particularly concerning
because they would penalize banks or lenders who had no intention of
discriminating, and in some cases, no knowledge of the discriminatory
impact.121
To help serve the purpose of the Inclusive Communities ruling
116. Id.
117. Jess Davis, Justices Uphold Broad Reading of Bias in Housing Law, LAW360 (June

25, 2015), https://lawlibproxy2.unc.edu:2147/articles/629024/justices-uphold-broad-readingof-bias-in-housing-law.
118. See Bankers to Obama: Stop ‘Abusing’ Disparate Impact Charges, supra note 15
(pointing out the 1.2 billion dollar shakedown of the banking industry using disparate impact
theory).
119. See Hancock & Glass, supra note 38 (pointing out that the Court stated that remedial
orders must “concentrate on the elimination of the offending practice” and seems to suggest
that cases of this type should not be subject to punitive sanctions).
120. See Hancock & Glass, supra note 38 (suggesting that the remedial orders should not
include punitive sanctions. Punitive sanctions for discrimination would increase the financial
risk for lenders).
121. Kirchner, supra note 3.
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and to combat this concern, the Court said that when a defendant is found
to have violated the FHA under the disparate impact theory, remedies
must concentrate on eliminating the offending practice through “race
neutral” means instead of punitive measures.122 This limitation should
eliminate concerns of racial quotas and the risk of punishing defendants
for unintentional discrimination.123 The standard should protect lenders
from expensive damages awarded to punish the defendant and allow
lenders to focus on appropriate remedies to the real issue—disparate
impact of lending policies on protected classes.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE LIMITATIONS ON DISPARATE IMPACT
LIABILITY
Since Inclusive Communities, a number of cases have discussed
these limitations under other provisions of the FHA, 124 but very few under
other fair lending causes of actions.125 In City of Los Angeles v. Wells
Fargo & Co.,126 the plaintiff brought a disparate impact claim under
another provision of the FHA.127 In dismissing the case, the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California adopted the test and held that
the city failed to point to a specific policy that caused an artificial,
arbitrary, or unnecessary barrier.128 Claims filed under ECOA and other
fair lending cause of actions have not used Inclusive Communities
standard129 as the court in Mora v. U.S. Bank N.A. seemed to follow the
122. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524.
123. Id.
124. See City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:13-cv-09007-ODW(RZx),

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93451, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015) (discussing Inclusive
Communities ruling for a claim arising under § 3605); County of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co.,
No. 1.2014-cv-09548, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93380 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2015); City of Miami
v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-24508-WPD, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15444 (11th Cir.
Fla. Sept. 1, 2015) (dismissed on standing grounds); Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14-cv3045, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111389 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2015).
125. See Merritt v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 5:09-cv-01179-JW, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 125284, at *58 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 17, 2015) (analyzing a fair lending cause of action but
not applying the new standard set in Inclusive Communities).
126. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:13-cv-09007-ODW(RZx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93451.
127. Id. at *14.
128. Peter Kang, Wells Fargo Dodges Lending Bias in Calif., Ill., LAW360 (July 17, 2015)
https://lawlibproxy2.unc.edu:2147/articles/680721/wells-fargo-dodges-lending-bias-suits-incalif-ill-.
129. See Mora v. US Bank, CV1502436DDPAJWX, 2015 WL 6681169 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
2, 2015); Frederick v. Capital One Bank (USA), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125111 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 17, 2015) (The standard still followed in recent cases is: “To state a claim for disparate
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old standard for disparate impact claims under ECOA.130
A.

Claims Brought Under Other Provisions of the FHA

The City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co. case is a great
example of how this decision can be applied to lenders under other
provisions of the FHA. First, the court reaffirmed that to establish a prima
facie case for disparate impact liability under the FHA, a plaintiff must
point to a specific practice or policy that has “robustly caused”131 a
disproportionately adverse impact on persons of a particular class.132
Second, the court reaffirmed the need to examine these claims with care
at the pleadings stage in order to protect defendants from being punished
for racial imbalances that they did not create.133 Third, the court
reaffirmed that disparate impact liability should only be used to remove
barriers that are artificial, arbitrary, or unnecessary. 134 Finally, but most
importantly, the court applied the standard set in Inclusive Communities
on a claim arguing a violation of a different provision under the FHA.135
By doing this, the court reaffirmed that this decision can impact lenders
involved in real estate-related transactions.136
In City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., the plaintiff claimed
that the defendant had violated the FHA by engaging in discriminatory
and predatory lending practices that resulted in a disparate number of
residential home foreclosures for minority borrowers.137 The plaintiff
claimed that Wells Fargo violated § 3605 of the FHA relying on disparate
impact theory with two of their lending practices: issuance of high-cost

impact discrimination under . . . the ECOA a plaintiff must plead (1) the existence of
outwardly neutral practices; (2) a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on persons
of a particular type produced by the defendant’s facially neutral acts or practices; and (3) facts
demonstrating a causal connection between the specific challenged practice or policy and the
alleged disparate impact.”).
130. Mora, 2015 WL 6681169, at *11–12.
131. City of Los Angeles 2015 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 93451, at *18.
132. Id. at 15.
133. Id. at 18.
134. Id. at 26.
135. Id. at 14.
136. By using Inclusive Communities as the standard in a real estate-related transaction,
the Court reaffirmed this decision can impact lenders. See id. at 12.
137. Id. at *2.
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and USFHA138 loans.139 During the case, the court granted the Motion
for Summary Judgment filed by Wells Fargo 140 and stated that the
undisputed facts demonstrated that Wells Fargo did not violate the
FHA.141 The court looked to Inclusive Communities to determine the
standard for FHA disparate impact claims and applied its precedent
accordingly.142 In addition, the court found that high-cost loans did not
violate the FHA, because the statistical disparity was not sufficiently
substantial or significant.143
This finding was especially important, because the court
recognized the prohibition against weighing the evidence at summary
judgment but said that the Supreme Court’s guidance in Inclusive
Communities precluded it and that the court must examine the claim with
care at the pleading stage.144 After examining the claim with care, the
court concluded that there was not enough evidence to support it but
nevertheless held that the plaintiff failed to identify a specific policy that
caused the statistical disparity. 145 With respect to the USFHA loans, the
court found that once again Wells Fargo did not violate the FHA, because
the plaintiff’s claim did not take into consideration the benefits of
USFHA loans.146 The court’s holding emphasized the importance of
examining these claims with care at the pleading stage and noted that the
claim would have been dismissed for failing to identify a specific practice
that caused the disparity.147
If the Inclusive Communities standard is consistently applied to
claims under the FHA, then this opinion could end up being a benefit to
the lenders. Even faced with a potential increase in disparate impact
claims, the requirements for a prima facie case under disparate impact is
more stringent and the requirements for the defense of business necessity
are easier to meet.148
138. USFHA loans are United States Federal Housing Authority loans, which are
described as loans with higher risk features. See id. at *4.
139. Id. at *5–6.
140. Id. at *12.
141. Id. at *24–25.
142. Id. at *25.
143. Id. at *26–27.
144. Id. at *32.
145. Id. at *25.
146. Id. at 11.
147. Id. at 12–13.
148. By placing new limitations on disparate impact claims, the Court made it more
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City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co. exemplifies the abuse
that could arise from disparate impact claims. There, the judge
admonished the plaintiff’s attorneys for taking an approach that would
have actually hurt the very minority borrowers for whom they were
advocating.149 This case reinforced many of the concerns noted in
Inclusive Communities,150 particularly the Court’s statement, “[i]f the
specter of disparate-impact litigation causes private developers to no
longer construct or renovate housing units for low-income individuals,
then the FHA would have undermined its own purpose as well as the freemarket system.”151 The Los Angeles attorneys decided to argue that the
USFHA loans violated the FHA because it was one of the only violations
not barred by the statute of limitations.152 A success by the L.A. lawyers
would have been unfortunate for minority borrowers; USFHA loans help
them overcome barriers like strict credit requirements and support them
in attaining the money needed for a down payment.153 If disparate impact
theory is used to challenge policies or practices that actually discriminate
in a way that helps minority borrowers, the very purpose of allowing
these types of claims is destroyed.154
B.

Claims Brought Under Other Fair Lending Causes of Actions

To date there have been few cases using the Inclusive
Communities standard to analyze other fair lending causes of action.
Claims arising under the ECOA applied the same standards as claims
under the FHA before Inclusive Communities and might adopt this new
standard going forward.155 In Mora v. U.S. Bank N.A,156 the plaintiff

difficult for the plaintiff to make a prima facie case and it easier for the defendant to meet his
burden when arguing business necessity. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive
Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2549–50 (2015).
149. Kang, supra note 128.
150. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2524 (2015).
151. Id.
152. City of Los Angeles 2015 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 93451, at *43–44.
153. Id. at *46.
154. Kang, supra note 128.
155. See Stohr, supra note 69 (assuming that because claims arising under the FHA and
ECOA before Inclusive Communities used the same standard, that ECOA claims will follow
the standard set in Inclusive Communities).
156. Mora v. US Bank, CV1502436DDPAJWX, 2015 WL 6681169 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2,
2015).
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claimed the defendant violated the ECOA by discriminating against them
as minority status borrowers.157 Instead of using the Inclusive
Communities standard, the court looked back to the original standard used
for both ECOA and FHA claims.158 The CFPB has maintained that the
ECOA allows disparate impact claims and that they will continue to use
it to fight discrimination.159 The recent uproar about abusive claims made
by the CFPB may lead to a push for this narrower standard.160 As of now,
though, it seems as if CFPB will use this ruling to support their position
that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ECOA, but there is
currently a debate as to whether courts should apply the more stringent
Inclusive Communities standard set by the Supreme Court.161
V. THE BEST WAYS FOR BANKS TO AVOID POTENTIAL LIABILITY FROM
DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS
The holding in Inclusive Communities creates a more favorable
standard for the lender to establish a defense, but it also opens the door
for an increased number of disparate impact claims. Given the recent fair
lending cases, bankers are seemingly caught between trying to accurately
price their credit products and avoid fair lending risk in providing access
to credit.162 Bankers and experts at the ABA’s Regulatory Compliance
Conference expressed four considerations that can help lenders navigate
the murky waters of fair lending enforcement.163 The first consideration
is for lenders to build a robust, data-driven fair lending compliance
management system in order to help minimize potential liability. 164 The
second is for lenders to be aware of discretionary pricing, because it
157. Id. at *1–2.
158. Id. at *2.
159. See Chris Bruce, Fair Lending: Supreme Court Ruling Sets Framework For

Disparate Impact Claims Under FHA, [2015] Banking Daily (BNA) No. 123 (June 26, 2015)
(discounting the statistics created by the CFPB; the court will likely tighten the requirements
on claims under ECOA as well).
160. See H.R. 1737, 114th Cong. (2015) (assuming that because of the abusive use of
disparate impact claims arising under ECOA, the court is more likely to tighten the
requirements on these type of claims as well).
161. The CFPB has argued that this case supports disparate impact claims being
cognizable under the ECOA but also continue to argue that the old standard is applied to these
type of claims. See Mora, 2015 WL 6681169, at *1.
162. Evan Sparks, Four Tips for Threading the Fair Lending Needle, 107 A.B.A.
BANKING J. 49, 1 (2015).
163. Id.
164. Id.
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establishes a presumption of discrimination.165 Third, lenders should
monitor fair lending risks across all customer interactions, especially
service, because discrimination does not always occur in the creation of
loans.166 Fourth, lenders must accept that disparate impact claims are
here to stay and track data accordingly. 167 The last recommendation is
especially important because of the increase in superficial analysis or
faulty statistics.168 The safest option for a banking lender is to conduct
their own data analysis to better defend themselves from these types of
claims.169
These recommendations will help better prepare banks to tackle
the increasingly difficult task of avoiding fair lending discrimination.170
Once banking lenders accept that disparate impact claims are here to stay,
they can begin to prevent and combat these claims. Moving forward, it
will be important to monitor the impact Inclusive Communities has on
other fair lending causes and how this new standard will impact disparate
impact claims arising under different provisions of the FHA.
BALLARD J. YELTON

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
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